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Heading South 
John C. Hawley 
ABSTRACT 
Terminology is always a site of politics, and "global South" is no ex-
ception. Many of the places proposed as likely areas for discussion in 
the pages of this new journal are not, in fact, south of the equator. 
Nor are other areas that are, in fact, south of the border necessarily as 
appropriate for discussion in this journal. Yet it is appropriate to reach 
for another terminological alleyway like this one to help us reimag-
ine, yet again, the peoples and topics in question. "Postcolonial," ei-
ther with or without a hyphen, is contentious; "commonwealth," of 
course, has been long abandoned (and for starters, is totally Anglo-
centric). "Non-aligned" is, perhaps, somewhat closer, but a good 
number of the "southern" peoples are, in fact, aligned. But the spirit 
of Bandung suggests that there is a general sense among the peoples 
in question that they recognize each other, and that they share a com-
mon destiny of being the industrialized world's underdogs. Can this 
sixth sense also give hope for a broader and non-eurocentric cosmo-
politanism, even a "subaltern" cosmospolitanism. Can a recuperation 
of the histories of such "other" mercantile and cultural interchanges, 
such as that of the Indian Ocean world, enliven and empower these 
groups to render a "flat" world something that is not inevitably one in 
which they are, once again, those who are pressed beneath the iron? 
Ffty ye•" •ftc. the B,ndung oonfmnco, hove thing• re•lly ch•nged fm 
its participants and for those they have come to symbolize in the larger world? 
Representing more than half the world's population at the time, the 29 coun-
tries challenged the world's colonizers: alternative hegemonic blocs might, in 
fact, be possible. Cooperation among the non-aligned, a sharing of techno-
logical and other expertises among the clients of the dominant first and second 
"worlds," might enable the relatively powerless to pull together as a counter-
vailing agent-no longer simply clients of the two sides in the cold war. At the 
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time, Nehru told his assembled colleagues that he was proud that his country 
belonged to neither bloc: 
If we have to stand alone, we will stand by ourselves, whatever happens 
(and India has stood alone without any aid against a mighty Empire, the 
British Empire) and we propose to face all consequences .... I know also 
that if we rely on others, whatever great powers they might be, if we look 
to them for sustenance then we are weak indeed. (Nehru 70, 72) 
He rejected those social scientists who spoke of his nation, and others like it, 
as irrelevant to "history"; in the arts, he would not have acknowledged the 
inevitability that the Caribbean, India, and Africa could only produce "minor" 
literatures: "I submit that moral force counts and the moral force of Asia and 
Africa must, in spite of the atomic and hydrogen bombs ofRussia, the U.S.A. 
or another country, count." Bold words, though finally more an idealistic plea 
than a gauntlet: to the outside world (please, let this moral force "count") and 
to those assembled at the conference (hang tough, do not be seduced by the 
baubles that the powerful will use to seduce you, as they seduce their own 
citizens-the bread and circuses routine). 
Inevitably, we must ask who has been doing the "accounting" in the years 
since Bandung, and what does the ledger reveal? One's mind flashes forward 
through the decades since 1955, observing on the one hand the arguable in-
consequence of the conference, the corruption and incompetence of countless 
ministers and bureaucrats of states represented in the meeting, the grinding 
poverty persisting in many of the countries that participated; and observing on 
the other hand the collapse of one bloc and the rise of American hegemony, 
the collapse of the World Trade Center and the rise of fundamentalist belief 
systems that care little for any nation, the startling threat to the environment 
that is widely accepted as unavoidable by "developers" of whatever nation. 
Where is the moral force to which Nehru referred? 
Perhaps its flame is kept alive at the United Nations? In its Millennium 
Project, the United Nations' Development Group set a number of highly am-
bitious goals to be achieved by 2015, including the following: halving the 
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day; halving the propor-
tion of people who suffer from hunger; ensuring that all boys and girls every-
where will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling; reducing by 
two-thirds the under-five mortality rate; reducing by three-quarters the ma-
ternal mortality ratio; halting and beginning to reverse the spread of HIV/ 
AIDS, malaria, and other major diseases; integrating the principles of sustain-
able development into country policies and programs and reversing the loss of 
environmental resources; halving the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation; making a significant im-
provement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers (by 2020); develop-
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ing further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and 
financial system; addressing the special needs of the Least Developed Coun-
tries, landlocked, and small island developing states; dealing comprehensively 
with the debt problems of developing countries; implementing strategies for 
decent and productive work for youth; providing access to affordable essential 
drugs; and making available the benefits of new technologies, especially infor-
mation and communication technologies ("Millennium"). One cannot simply 
echo the tired cynicism of Alphonse Karr: plus ~a change, plus ~a la meme 
chose-and yet, 2015 is less than a decade away. A good deal has, in fact, 
changed-but to what effect, and to whose benefit? This, as I understand it, 
will be a question central to this new journal. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace uses 12 markers to rank 
the likelihood that a state will fail (demographic pressures, refugees and dis-
placed persons, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic 
decline, delegitimization of state, public services, human rights, security ap-
paratus, factionalized elites, and external intervention). By these measures, the 
most likely to fail, in order, are: Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia, Haiti, 
Afghanistan, Rwanda, North Korea, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Bangla-
desh, Burundi, the Dominican Republic, and the Central African Republic. 
The next 40 hold no surprises: Kenya ranks 25'\ Ethiopia 30'\ Tanzania and 
Guatemala 31'', Pakistan 34'\ Egypt 38'\ Saudi Arabia 45'\ Indonesia 46'\ 
Turkey 49'h. Almost without exception, they all rank 9 out of 10 in the mea-
sure of "uneven development." In stark terms, while India and China show 
signs of growing economic strength, they have a long way to go, and the others 
have generally receded further from economic independence. 
Conversely, in A. T. Kearney's and Foreign Policy's fifth annual globaliza-
tion study, using four dimensions of analysis (economic integration: trade, foreign 
direct investment; personal contact: telephone, travel, remittances and personal 
transfers; technological connectivity: internet users, internet hosts, secure servers; 
and political engagement: international organizations, U.N. peacekeeping, trea-
ties, government transfers), there were a few surprises. Singapore retained first 
place; Ireland dropped to second (it had tied last year for first); Switzerland 
retained the third spot, but the United States fell three places, to fourth. These 
were followed by: Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Finland, 
New Zealand, United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Israel, France, Malaysia, Slovenia, Germany, etc. Malaysia maybe is a surprise, 
coming ahead of Germany? A few subsequent points of interest: the highest 
Latin American country was Panama, coming in at 24'h (and ranking two spots 
ahead of Spain); the next was Chile at 34'h, then Mexico at 42"d, and Argentina 
at 47th. Uganda was the highest African nation, ranking 33'd; Tunisia was 3]th 
and Botswana 38'h; Morocco 40'h and Senegal 41''; Nigeria 44'h and South 
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Africa 48'\ Kenya was 49'h. Among the largest changes since the year before: 
Croatia rose seven ranks; Uganda rose 5; Botswana fell 8; Morocco rose 7; Sri 
Lanka rose 8; Argentina fell13 (to 47'h place); Kenya rose 5, as Russia fell8 (to 
52"d place, between Colombia and Peru); China rose 3 - to 54'h place (econo-
mists make the point that China's barely sustainable growth rate of9% per year 
has not seemed to have trickled down very meaningfully to the vast population, 
though some individuals are surely getting wealthy, and a caste system as in days 
of yore seems to be reemerging); India (despite its marriage to Silicon Valley, 
etc.) stayed just where it was: 61". And, for the fifth year in a row, Iran took last 
place, at 62. It was interesting to note that the United States was 61" in trade, 
58'" in remittances and personal transfers, and 57'h in treaties. Bangladesh, on 
the other hand, ranked 10'h in remittances and personal transfers (Morocco 
ranked 4'\ Uganda 3'd, and the Philippines 2"d). South Korea ranked second in 
internet users. Portugal was first in U.N. peacekeeping (the U.S. was 28'h). 
Meanwhile, the so-called G-24 (the Intergovernmental Group ofTwenty-
Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development) is pressing for 
more power for its members in the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. The G-24, taking its cue from Bandung, attempts to sharpen its 
focus in the area of finance. It is made up of the following countries: Algeria, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Argentina, Brazil (57'h on the globalization 
index), Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezu-
ela, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Syria (off the 
globalization chart). China is a Special Invitee and addresses the plenary ses-
sions of the group. This seems evidence, though multiply interpretable, that 
William Easterly may have a point: in his jeremiad bemoaning the self-serving 
nature of the Group of 8's involvement in the United Nations' Millennium 
Project, he offers one ray of hope. "Poor countries," he suggests, "are making 
progress on their own, without waiting for the West to save them" (64). Piece-
meal projects (one thinks of the Grameen Bank, deworming drugs, bed nets, 
etc.) have proven to be far more effective, in his view, than the grand Robert-
Owenesque dreams. Alexander Gerschenkron and Alice Amsden note, how-
ever, that "the later a country industrializes in chronological history, the greater 
the probablility that its major manufacturing firms will be foreign-owned 
(Amsden 286). Countries such as China, India, Korea and Taiwan have ad 
opted an independent approach ("New Electronic"), and countries such as Ar-
gentina, Chile, Mexico and Turkey are more integrationist-but both finally 
rely on the level of local capabilities. 
If anyone is listening, Samir Amin once again channels the spirit ofBand-
ung and offers the world's leaders two options. The first is a polycentrism that 
reduces the centers of decision-making to five: the U.S., Europe, the U.S.S.R. 
(his book was published in 1990), China, and Japan. The second option ("the 
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only one acceptable") envisages, in addition to these five centers, "the crystal-
lization of new forces organized at various regional levels of the Third World 
(Latin America, the Arab world, Africa, Indian and South-East Asia)" (228). 
Over the years since Bandung, attempts by members of this sixth group of 
countries to coalesce into meaningful partnerships have failed to achieve 
meaningful traction. One hears less talk about blocs competing against each 
other, and more of a "flat" world in which competence will be rewarded by the 
marketplace. 
A journal such as the one we are here inaugurating may therefore be ex-
pected to enter the fray as a gadfly, as a mouthpiece or an advocate, as a kind of 
conscience, lest the steamrollers be met with a naive smile of unabashed wel-
come. Imagination in such an enterprise is important. Looking, for example, at 
a Hobo-Dyer world map, one is forced to re-think one's place in such projec-
tions. One version of the map has Africa at its center; the other has the Pacific 
Ocean at the center, with south at the top. The refocusing is disorienting. But 
what is the measure of "south," anyway? If the equator is to set the boundary, 
then more than half of African nations are disqualified; central America and 
one-fourth of South America are ruled out; so is India and the entire subconti-
nent. Yet, do Americans not generally think of everything south of its borders 
as "southern"-whatever else that may imply for them? And Australia, on the 
other hand, is incongruously included in the actual list of south-of-the-equator. 
Perhaps the term refers, then, to "colored" nations. In any event, the trick is to 
re-envision what has for some time been referred to as the "postcolonial" world. 
There seems little doubt that the people of"the south" recognize each other-
and recognize,. as well, that Hobo-Dyer is on very few walls. So far. 
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